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Abstract
This paper examines the validity of the purchasing power parity,
PPP for six African countries of Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria,
South Africa and Tanzania using the countriesbilateral real exchange
rates with their fteen major trading partners for the period 1960-
2011. It uses the Lagrangian multiplier, LM, which accommodates up
to two endogenous structural breaks in addition to conventional unit
root tests. The paper also uses the threshold cointegration tests to
explore nonlinearity and asymmetric adjustments of the series. Re-
sults from the LM unit root tests indicate that the exchange rates of
Botswana, Ghana, Kenya and Nigeria relative to their major trading
partners are stationary. The results from the threshold cointegration
suggest that there is a long-run relationship between the series and
that the adjustments are asymmetric. Appreciation is faster than de-
preciation in most of the countries. This is consistent with suggestions
that countries are intolerant of depreciation.
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1 Introduction
The purchasing power parity, PPP, hypothesis has been a major topical
issue over the years and a huge amount of empirical work has been done
in the area for both developed and developing countries. The major reason
for this interest is because of an important implication it has on trade and
capital movements. Over the years, the evidences presented by the empirical
literature are generally mixed, which were largely attributed to di¤erences
in methodology and the sample period covered by these studies. This is
because the sample period may contain structural breaks that could be due
to policy regime shifts and structural shocks, which were largely overlooked.
The empirical literature on the PPP can be classied into four groups
based on the methodology used. The rst group is the literature that used
univariate unit root tests to examine the PPP hypothesis, but arrived at
di¤erent conclusions. For example, Grilli and Kaminsky (1991) reported
evidence that supports the validity of the PPP whereas Doganlar, et al.
(2009) and Flynn and Boucher (1993) did not nd evidence that supports
the PPP. Furthermore, results from sub-sample of the data studied are also
at variance with one another. For example, Grilli and Kaminsky (1991) nd
that the PPP holds for the entire sample period, but not for the sub-samples
of oating and xed regime periods while Odedokun (2000) reports that the
PPP holds in 17 out of 35 countries studied.
The second group consists of those who applied panel unit root tech-
niques. Frankel and Rose (1996), Papell and Theodoridis (1998), OConnell,
(1998), Fleissig and Strauss (2000) and Taylor (2002) fall within this group.
Their ndings are generally supportive of the PPP hypothesis. The third
one is a sub-set of the literature that used nonlinear unit root techniques.
This includes Taylor et al. (2001), Chortareas, et al. (2002), Kilian and
Taylor (2003), Sarno, et al. (2004) and Yilanci and Eris (2013). The results
from this group have indicated that there is evidence of nonlinear mean
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reversion.
The fourth one includes those who have applied linear and nonlinear
cointegration to investigate the PPP hypothesis. This literature looks into
symmetric and asymmetric long run relationship between nominal exchange
rate and the domestic and foreign price levels. Those that applied lin-
ear cointegration include Karfakis and Moschos (1989), Kim (1990), Mah-
davi and Zhou (1994) and Kargbo (2006) and they found support for the
PPP hypothesis. Enders and Dibooglu (2001), Enders and Chumruspho-
nlert (2004), Holmes and Wang (2006) and Karoglou and Morley (2012),
on the other hand, have used asymmetric cointegration techniques to look
into the relationship between nominal exchange rate and the domestic and
foreign price levels. They have also found evidence that is supportive of the
PPP hypothesis.
This study tests for the long-run PPP hypothesis in six African countries
by analyzing their bilateral exchange rates relative to their trading partners1.
These are Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa and Tanzania.
These countries have undertaken reforms in the 1980s and the 1990s, from
which trade and foreign exchange liberalization were part of. The main
aim was to have their exchange rates as close as possible to their long-
run equilibrium rates. Thus, making the countries good candidates for the
analysis.
The major contribution of the paper is three folds. First, we examine the
numeraire currency in validating the PPP condition by expressing the six
African real exchange rates with their main trading partners. This approach
is a departure from the existing literature, whch has used the exchange rates
denominated in the US dollar. Instead, the paper uses the countriesbilat-
eral real exchange rates based on the numeraire currency. Secondly, we
examine the properties of the time series to identify the possibility of struc-
1The number of countries and the sample size are both determined by availability of
data. This is discussed under the Data Section of the paper.
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tural breaks in the data using the LM test that allows up to two structural
breaks. Third, the study used Threshold Cointegration Tests of Enders and
Siklos (2001) to investigate nonlinearity and asymmetric adjustments of the
series. This is important as identied by various authors that authorities
try to inuence the behaviour of their exchange rates. It was found by this
literature that countries are generally intolerant to exchange rate deprecia-
tion and therefore, they use monetary policy as well as direct intervention in
the foreign exchange markets to prevent their domestic currencies from de-
preciating or appreciating2. These actions can lead to both nonlinearity and
asymmetric adjustments in the series. Overlooking them may have serious
implication for conclusion on whether the PPP holds or not.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section outlines
and explain the methodology used in the paper. Section 3 discusses the data
as well as analyses the estimated results while Section 4 concludes.
2 Methodology
2.1 The Unit Root Tests
The LM test of Lee and Strazicich (2003), endogenously determines struc-
tural breaks in a series. It also addresses the problems of bias and spurious
rejections which other tests are criticized of as shown in Lee and Strazicich
(2003) that it is based on the LM principles. Furthermore, the tests corre-
spond to Perrons (1989) exogenous structural break with a change in the
level and the trend. Lee and Strazicichs (2003) model allows for two en-
dogenous breaks both under the null and the alternative hypothesis3.4 The
2See Calvo and Reinhart (2002) for full discussions.
3The LM unit root tests statistics is given by:  = t-statistics for testing the
null of a unit root ( = 0). To endogenously determine the location of two breaks
j =
TBJ
T
; j = 1; 2

; the minimum LM unit root selects all plausible break points for
the minimum statistic. See Lee and Strazicich (2003) for the details of the model.
4 In addition, we also run conventional unit root tests: augmented Dickey Fuller, ADF
and Phillips Perron, PP. These are standard tests found in the literature and hence, they
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test has been shown to perform well as compared to other data-dependent
procedures that select the number of lagged augmented terms. Advantages
of the two-break minimum LM unit root test can be summarized as fol-
lows. First, the break points are endogenously determined from the data.
Second, the test is not subject to spurious rejections in the presence of a
unit root with break(s). Third, when the alternative hypothesis is true and
spurious rejections are absent, Lee and Strazicich (2003) demonstrate that
the two-break minimum LM test has greater or comparable power to the
Lumsdaine-Papell, LP, Test.
2.2 Asymmetric Cointegration Tests
To examine the long-run PPP and also explore the possibility of non-linearity
as well as asymmetric adjustments in the series, the study uses the Enders
and Siklos (2001) asymmetric cointegration methodology. Relationship be-
tween nominal exchange rates and domestic and foreign price levels can be
expressed as:
et = 0 + 1p

t + 2pt + "t (1)
where et is the logarithm of the bilateral exchange rates in the domestic
currency; pt and pt represent the logarithm of foreign and domestic price
levels, respectively, and "t is the stochastic disturbance term. The model in
equation (1) can be tested for a long-run relationship. After estimating the
model, the obtained residuals series "t are subjected to a unit root test that
in form of:
"t = "t 1 + t (2)
where "t is the regression residuals from equation (1) and assumed to be
purely white noise with a zero mean and a constant variance while t is an
independent and identically distributed disturbance with zero mean. If the
are not discussed here.
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null  = 0 can be rejected, then "t is stationary. The model in equation
(2) assumes a symmetric adjustment process and, therefore, change in "t
is "t 1 regardless of whether "t 1 is positive or negative. But, if bilateral
exchange rate and the price levels exhibit asymmetric adjustment behaviour,
then the model in equation (2) is mis-specied. Enders and Siklos (2001)
propose two test of asymmetries; a threshold autoregressive (TAR) and a
momentum-threshold autoregressive (M-TAR) models. Following Enders
and Siklos (2001) two di¤erent hypotheses can be tested. The TAR model
is given as:
"t = It1"t 1 + (1  It) 2"t 1 + t (3)
where It is the Heaviside indicator such that
It =

1 if "t 1  
0 if "t 1 < 

(4)
where  is the value of the threshold and it is endogenously determined using
the Chan (1993) technique. The method arranges the values of "t and "t
for the TAR and the M-TAR models respectively in ascending order and
excludes the smallest and the largest 15%, making  consistent estimate
which yields the smallest residual sum of squares over the remaining 70%.
The M-TAR model takes the following form:
"t = Mt1"t 1 + (1 Mt) 2"t 1 + t (5)
where Mt is the Heaviside indicator function of the form
Mt =

1 if "t 1  
0 if "t 1 < 

: (6)
The necessary condition for the stationarity of "t is that 1 < 0; 2 < 0 and
(1 + 1) (1 + 2) < 1.
5 If "t 1 is above the long-run equilibrium value, then
adjustment is at the rate of 1; but if "t 1 is below the long-run equilibrium
value then adjustment is at the rate of 2. However, adjustment is symmetric
5See Petrucelli and Woolford (1984) for full details.
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if 1 = 2. Therefore, where the null hypothesis H0 : (1 = 2) is rejected,
then the TAR model can be used to capture the signs of the asymmetries.
The M-TAR model is useful when the adjustment exhibits more momentum
in one direction than the other. That is, the speed of adjustment depends
on whether "t 1 is increasing or decreasing. If j1j < j2j, then increases
in "t 1 may tend to persist, whereas decreases revert back to the threshold
are done quickly.
Enders and Siklos (2001) proposed two sets of tests to test the null hy-
pothesis H0 : 1 = 2 in equation (5) for both the TAR and M-TAR models.
The F statistic does not follow the standard distribution, consequently, u
from the estimated TAR model is compared with u for the M-TAR model
provided in Enders and Siklos (2001). Since there is no presumption whether
to use TAR or M-TAR model, the recommendation is to use the information
criteria to determine the better model among the two. If the residuals in
equations (3) and (5) are serially correlated, they are:
"t = It1"t 1 + (1  It) 2"t 1 +
pX
i=1
i"t i + t (7)
and
"t = Mt1"t 1 + (1 Mt) 2"t 1 +
pX
i=1
i"t i + t (8)
Model in equation (7) represents the new TAR model while the one in equa-
tion (8) is the modied M-TAR model, respectively.
3 Data and the Estimated Results
3.1 Data
The data-set used in this analysis consists of annual series covering the
period 1960 - 2011 for six Africa countries6. The countries covered are
6The sample period of 1960-2011 was a limitation imposed by availability of data
for the countries studied. However, the number of observations is adequate for time
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Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa and Tanzania along with
their fteen major trading partners. The bilateral real exchange rate is
constructed from the bilateral nominal exchange rate, et; consumer price
indices (foreign, pt and domestic, pt), using qt = et + pt   pt (all in logs).
The exchange rates are expressed in terms of the numeraire. The data are
sourced from the World Bank Development Indicators database.
3.2 The Unit Root Test Results
3.2.1 The ADF and the PP Tests
In addition to the LM test discussed in Section 2 above, we also present and
discuss the Augmented Dickey Fuller, ADF, and the Philips-Perron, PP,
unit root tests have also been carried out. The results are reported in Ta-
bles 1a - 1f. The results for the ADF are reported in the left column of each
of the tables while the right column reports those of the PP test. Results
for Botswanas exchange rates relative to its trading partners in Table 1a
indicate that the series are stationary with respect to eleven countries out
of the fteen countries investigated as suggested by the ADF test. However,
the model with both a constant and a trend rejects the null of unit root in
thirteen countries. Thus, implying evidence for the PPP in thirteen coun-
tries. Results in Table 1b show that Ghanas bilateral real exchange rates
from both tests indicate fewer rejections of the null. The model with a con-
stant only rejects the null with respect to Turkey, whereas the model with a
constant and a trend reports evidence that supports the PPP with respect
to Singapore and Turkey. The reason for the non-rejection of the null of unit
root for Ghanas exchange rates with its partners might not be unconnected
series analysis as evident in literature. It is well established in the literature that annual
observations of this magnitude or less are used for this type of analysis. Among those who
used similar number of observations for such analysis include Bajo-Rubio et al (2004) who
used annual series of 1964-2001, Mohammadi (2009) used annual data of 1960-2007, Onu
(2014) analysed annual data of 1960-2010, Trachanas and Katrakilidis (2013a) and (2013b)
that have used 1970-2010 and 1971-2009 annual series, respectively and Valadkhani and
Nameni (2011) that used 1960-2008 annual series.
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to several currency crises experienced by the domestic currency, the Cedi,
and the subsequent re-denomination of the exchange rate in January, 2008.
Results for Kenya from the two test show that the model with a con-
stant reveals that the exchange rates are stationary with respect to eleven
countries, while the model with a constant and a trend reports evidence that
suggest the stationarity of the series with respect to eight trading countries.
That is the tests failed to reject the null of unit root in these countries as
evident in Table 1c. The Nigerias bilateral real exchange rates did not ex-
hibit mean reverting characteristics with all the countries as indicated by
the model with a constant only by both tests. However, the model with
both a constant and a trend reveal evidence supportive of the rejection of
the null of unit root. The model indicates stationarity of the series with
respect to eleven out of the fteen countries examined.
Results for South Africas bilateral exchange rates are contained in Table
1e. The model with a constant only suggests failure to reject the null of unit
root in the series in respect of nine countries. That is the exchange rates
are stationary in respect of these countries as indicated by both the ADF
and the PP tests. The model with a constant and a trend reports similar
number of rejections by the tests. It is clear from Table 1f that results
from the model with a constant suggests that the Tanzanias bilateral real
exchange rates fail to reject the null of unit root in favour of the alternative
with respect to only one country by both tests. However, the model with
both a constant and a time trend from the two tests reject the null of a unit
root with respect to six countries.
It could be noted from the foregoing that the model with both a constant
and a time trend reported more cases of failure to reject the null of unit root
in the series and, in addition, the time trends have also been statistically
signicant. This could be suggestive for the presence of structural breaks.
Secondly, countries that experienced currency crisis and other economic is-
9
sues that subsequently led to the introduction of structural reforms have
higher number of failure to reject of the null of unit root. For example,
Ghana which recorded currency crisis and as a consequent introduced series
of structural reforms has higher non rejections of the null than Botswana
that has relatively stable economic and exchange rates.
3.2.2 The LM Test with Structural Breaks
The results from the LM Test that can account for up to two structural
breaks are reported in Table 2. The results reported indicate evidence in
favour of the PPP for Botswanas bilateral exchange rates relative to its
eleven trading partners. The LM test with one structural break rejects the
null of a unit root with respect to fourteen countries while one with two
breaks rejected the null of a unit root for the Botswanas bilateral exchange
rates with Israel, which was previously failed to reject by the one with one
break. The results from the LM Test for In Ghana show that its bilateral
exchange rate with all its trading partners exhibit mean reversion character-
istics. This is in contrast to only two suggested by the PP Test; its exchange
rates with Singapore and Turkey. Similarly, the LM Test that allowed for
one breaks reports that the Kenyas bilateral exchange rates with nine of its
trading partners considered are stationary. The results, therefore, suggest
that the PPP holds for Kenyas bilateral exchange rate relative to nine of
its major trading partners studied. However, the model that accounted for
two structural breaks indicate that the exchange rates with all the fteen
countries in the sample are stationary.
Also, in addition to the ten countries where the PP test provides evidence
supportive of the PPP for the Nigerias real exchange rates, the LM with
one structural break test rejects the null of unit root with three additional
bilateral exchange rates. The test with two structural breaks found further
evidence that supports the PPP hypothesis in all the fteen bilateral real
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exchange rates considered. South Africas results indicate that additional
evidence supporting the validity of the PPP hypothesis was reported by
both the LM Test with one and two structural breaks. Results from the
test with two structural breaks have indicated that two additional bilateral
exchange rates exhibit evidence in favour of the PPP. However, both the
PP and the LM Tests show that South African bilateral exchange rates with
the Netherlands are stationary. The LM Test with one break reports that
Tanzanias real exchange rate show characteristics of mean reversion with
nine countries in contrast to six reported by the PP. However, the LM Test
with two structural breaks revealed that null of unit root was rejected for
the countrys real exchange rates with twelve countries.
The identied structural break dates by the LM Test were shown to have
taken place mostly between the late seventies and nineties. The former was
the period of severe external shocks experienced by the countries whereas
the latter reects institutional and structural reforms undertaken by the
countries. The external shocks include oil price slumps of the 1990s and the
resultant worsening in terms of trade as the countries are oil dependents,
except Nigeria and Ghana for part of the sample period covered. Related
here is commodity booms and bursts, particularly those of the 1970s, which
constitute bulk of the countries exports and whose revenues most of the
countries depend on.
For example, in the case of Botswana, the 1970s was the period that
marked the end of severe droughts the country experienced accompanied
with a surge in foreign aid. An intensive diamond exploration and exports
also started during this period, which helped the economy to record an
annual growth rate of over 20%. Botswana had also withdrawn from the
Southern African Monetary Union in 1976 and subsequently introduced its
own currency, the Pula, which replaced the South African Rand. The late
1970s and early 1980s saw the peak of the global diamondsprice to about
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$60,000 per carat stone. This was known as the period of massive diamond
price bubbles. It is evident from the identied break dates that these, among
others, are responsible for the break dates.
In addition to the external factors discussed, internal domestic policies
that seem to reect the break dates identied for Ghana and Kenya are the
economic reforms introduced in 1983 and early 1990s. Kenya introduced
economic structural reforms in 1980s and a subsequent one in 1993. Both
seem to have been identied by the LM Tests. Similarly, in response to
economic crisis faced by the country, Nigeria has introduced series of eco-
nomic reforms, which started with an austerity measure in 1982. This was
followed by major reform programmes in 1986, 1994 and 2003. For South
Africa, the additional break dates reect the end of apartheid system in the
early 1990s and economic reforms of the late 1990s and 2000s. Tanzania also
implemented economic reforms in 1986 and a follow-up programme between
1996 and 1999.
3.3 The Results from the Cointegration Tests
3.3.1 Symmetric Cointegration Tests
Symmetric cointegration test procedure, where the lag length for each coun-
try is selected using the AIC was applied to the series. The results are
reported in Table 3 from, which it is evident that the null of no cointegra-
tion was failed to be rejected for Botswanas bilateral exchange rate with
nine of its major trading partners, while Ghanas and Kenyas real exchange
rates, twelve for each. The results for Nigeria and South Africa show that
the null of no cointegration of their exchange rate with their trading part-
ners was failed to be rejected in respect to eight countries with the former
and for 15 major trading partners in the case of the latter.
Non detection of cointegration among the series reported in Table 3
from the linear tests could be attributed to the presence of linearities and
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asymmetric adjustments of the series back to their fundamental subsequent
to shocks. Moreover, these tests generally, have low power. Failure to reject
the null of no cointegration by conventional tests of cointegration in the
presence of nonlinearities and structural changes are well documented in the
literature. For example, see among others Hansen and Seo (2002), Kejriwal
and Perron (2008) and Balke and Fomby (1997). To address this, the paper
uses the asymmetric cointegration of Enders and Siklos (2001) methodology
explained in Section 2 and the estimated results are discussed in 3.3.2 below.
3.3.2 Asymmetric Cointegration Tests
The information criteria were used to determine whether the adjustment
mechanism is best captured as a TAR or M-TAR process, while the Ljung-
Box Q-statistic was used to determine whether the estimated model is free
from serial correlation or otherwise. The results of the Enders and Siklos
(2001) tests are reported in Table 4. Results for Botswanas real exchange
rates relative to its fteen trading partners indicate rejection of the null of
no cointegration of the series with eight of its trading partners as compared
to six reported from the symmetric cointegration tests. In addition, the
speed of adjustment towards the PPP is signicant based on Enders and
Dibooglu (2001). The adjustment is symmetric in all the cases, except that
of Norway as the null of 1 = 2 was rejected at all the conventional level of
signicance. Thus, indicates evidence for asymmetric adjustments back to
equilibrium.
Results for threshold cointegration test for Ghanas real exchange rates
show that the M-TAR model is favoured in most cases as the series with re-
spect of 13 out of 15 countries. There is, therefore, strong evidence in favour
of the PPP from the results. A major di¤erence between these results and
those reported in Table 3 for Ghana is that the evidence for cointegration
and long-run PPP is substantially strengthened when asymmetries are ac-
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commodated. In addition, the long-run PPP holds in all the cases, where
symmetric adjustment is also rejected, except only in the real exchange rates
relative to Nigeria.
The results for Kenyas real exchange rates indicate that the null of
no cointegration is rejected in relation to China, Egypt, France, India, the
Netherlands, Pakistan and Spain at various levels of signicance. Results for
Nigerias real exchange rates indicate that the M-TAR model is preferred to
the TAR model, except in relation to Columbia and Ghana. Therefore, the
results from the asymmetric tests provide evidence in support of the long-
run PPP for Nigerias exchange rates with its fourteen out of fteen trading
partners. Tests for the null of symmetric adjustments were also rejected in
respect of all the series except for Ghana.
As evident from the results, test for threshold cointegration of South
Africas real exchange rate with its fteen trading partners show that the
AIC selects the M-TAR model as the preferred model in most cases. That
is 10 out of 15 cases. It is also clear that the null of no cointegration was
rejected with respect to South Africas exchange rates relative to nine of its
trading partners out of fteen analyzed. A major di¤erence between these
results and those in Table 3 is that the evidence for cointegration and the
long-run PPP is substantially strengthened when asymmetries in adjust-
ments are taken care of. This is because the null of symmetric adjustment
was rejected in all the cases except with respect to Switzerland at all the
conventional level of signicance. Threshold cointegration was found for
Tanzanias bilateral exchange rates with ten of its trading partners, which
are Bahrain, Japan, Kenya, Malaysia, South Africa, Saudi Arabia, Singa-
pore, Switzerland, Turkey and the US.
In general, results from the threshold cointegration procedure suggest
that the long-run relationship exists between the bilateral real exchange rates
of the countries considered relative to most of their major trading partners
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analyzed7. This, therefore, indicates that PPP holds for these countries
for the period covered. It is also found that in most cases, there is strong
evidence that supports presence for asymmetric adjustments of these series
back to their equilibrium. Results for Botswana show that the adjustments
of the bilateral exchange rates are asymmetric with all its trading partners
considered, apart from Norway and Israel. Appreciation is faster with ten
countries than depreciation while the opposite is the case with Belgium and
Switzerland. Asymmetric adjustments detected for Ghana real exchange
rates are with nine of its trading partners, where appreciation is faster with
ve countries and depreciation is quicker with three countries. These are
Egypt, France and the Netherlands.
Adjustments are asymmetric in case of Ghana with eleven of its trading
partners where appreciation is faster in all of them, except with Nigeria,
South Africa and the US. Asymmetries in adjustment of Nigeria bilateral
exchange rates were recorded for all its trading countries studied, except with
Ghana. Nigeria and Ghana have been members of the Economic Community
of West African States (ECOWAS), since the mid-1970s. This might be the
explanation for the lack of asymmetries in their bilateral exchange rates.
Among the asymmetries found, appreciation is faster in six countries and
depreciation is quicker in the rest. Nine cases of asymmetric adjustments
are found for both South Africa and Tanzania and appreciation is faster in
all the cases for the former, except for Botswana. It is worth-noting that
Botswana is a very small economy that depends on South Africa for most
of its imports. South African economy dominates the whole region, which
explains the behaviour of its bilateral exchange rates with Botswana. For
Tanzania, the asymmetric adjustments indicate that appreciation is faster
with respect of Kenya and the UK while depreciation is faster for the rest
of the countries.
7This indicates the superiority of the test over the symmetric ones as noted by Bohl
(2003).
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It is evident from the foregoing that appreciation is faster than depre-
ciation in most cases, which means that depreciation or appreciation in
adjustment process is not symmetric. This is consistent with the results re-
ported by the sub-literature that looks into di¤erences between the declared
(de jure) exchange rate regimes and what the countries do (de facto). It
was found that, in general, countries are less tolerant to exchange rate de-
preciation than appreciation (Calvo & Reinhart, 2002; Reinhart and Rogo¤
(2005).8
Overall, the results suggest that accounting for structural breaks led
to improved evidence for the PPP hypothesis. This is consistent with a
number of papers that emphasize importance of addressing non-linearity
and structural breaks in the PPP analysis. Authors that demonstrate this
include Narayan et al (2009), Gomez-Zaldirar, et al (2013), Dimitriou and
Simos (2013) and Sabate et al (2003).
However, there are two limitations of this paper that needed to be high-
lighted. First, the LM unit root test used can only accommodate up to two
structural breaks. Given the fact that domestic policy changes and external
shocks to commodity prices that these countries depend on are frequent,
there is a high probability that the breaks could exceed two that the frame-
work allows. This is an apparent limitation, even though, it could be argued
that the threshold cointegration can mitigate this to some extent. Secondly,
the frequency and the time span of the sample can also obliterate some
structural breaks and non-linearity in the data-set. This is, as acknowl-
edged above, a constraint placed by non-availability of data. Therefore, this
suggests further analysis when higher frequency and/or longer time span
data-set becomes available.
8This literature argues that countries try to inuence the behaviour of their real ex-
change rate by using monetary policy (changes in money supply or interest rates) and
direct intervention in foreign exchange markets.
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4 Conclusion
This paper has investigated the validity of the PPP using the bilateral real
exchange rates of six African countries, namely; Botswana, Ghana, Kenya,
Nigeria, South Africa and Tanzania with their fteen major trading partners.
The ADF, the PP and the LM unit root tests of Lee and Strazicich (2003),
which accounts for up to two structural breaks in series, were used. In
addition, the long-run relationship between the series was also investigated
by applying symmetric and asymmetric threshold cointegration of Enders
and Siklos (2001).
The results from both the ADF and the PP as well as symmetric coin-
tegration are, generally, mixed. Results from the ADF and the PP tests
suggest that the null of unit root is rejected for part of the sub-sample of the
six countries studied: 13 countries for Botswana, two countries for Ghana,
eleven countries for Kenya and Nigeria, twelve countries for South Africa
and six countries for Tanzania. The LM Test, on the other hand, reports
additional evidence that supports the existence of the PPP in all the coun-
tries covered. The results show that the PPP holds for fourteen countries
in respect of South African trading partners and thirteen each for Tanzania
and Botswana. For the rest of the countries covered; Ghana, Kenya and
Nigeria, the results from the LM Test show that evidence in favour of the
PPP exists between these countriesbilateral exchange rates with all their
fteen major trading partners investigated. The identied break dates by
the LM Tests coincide with the periods of external shocks, such as terms
of trade and oil price shocks. Other break dates correspond to the policy
regime shifts during the structural reforms programmes implemented by the
countries.
In investigating long-run relationship between the series, results from
symmetric cointegration tests could not reject the null of no cointegration
for most of the countries. Results from the model that uses the linear cointe-
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gration test show that there is evidence of the long-run PPP for six countries
in respect of Botswana whereas results for Ghana and Kenya, the evidence
of the long-run PPP exists between the series for only three out of their
fteen major trading partners considered. However, the results found sup-
port for the PPP from the linear cointegration test are more for Nigeria and
Tanzania. Eight bilateral exchange rates are found to exhibit the long-run
relationships. For South Africa, the results indicate presence of evidence in
favour of the PPP with only four of its major trading partners. However, the
threshold cointegration test shows that the PPP hypothesis is supported in
all the countries. This indicates importance of accounting for non-linearity
in the study. The study also explores whether adjustments of these bilateral
real exchange rates of the countries with their fteen major trading part-
ners can be captured by linear or asymmetric models. Given the greater
likelihood of price and information rigidities in the goods markets of these
countries as well as exchange rate market interventions by monetary policy
to defend their currencies, particularly from depreciations, it is important to
investigate possibilities of nonlinearity in the series. Therefore, possibility
of asymmetries in the adjustment mechanism was accounted for.
Threshold cointegration approach suggests that the degree of mean rever-
sion of the series back to equilibrium is generally higher when asymmetries
are accounted for. It was generally found that appreciation is faster than
depreciation, which supports the view that countries are more intolerant of
real exchange rate depreciation than appreciation. The threshold cointegra-
tion results show that a long-run relationship exists between the series for
all the countries studied along with their fteen trading partners. This indi-
cates that the linear cointegration approach might be biased in the presence
of asymmetries adjustments.
18
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Table 1a: Botswana Bilateral Real Exchange Rates
ADF Unit Root Test PP Unit Root Test
Countries  
Belgium [C] -0.449 -
Belgium [CT] -2.548 2.296**
Canada [C] -3.958* -
Canada [CT] -3.131 2.639**
China [C] -6.448* -
China [CT] -6.849* 1.852***
France [C] -1.402 -
France [CT] -1.824 1.671
India [C] -6.565* -
India [CT] 0.806 2.594***
Israel [C] -1.266 -
Israel [CT] -2.405 -2.068**
Japan [C] -0.328 -
Japan [CT] -2.278 -2.229**
Norway [C] -1.820 -
Norway [CT] -1.508 0.933
South Africa [C] -8.206* -
South Africa [CT] -3.422*** 0.995
Switzerland [C] 1.682 -
Switzerland [CT] -0.154 1.504
Thailand [C] -7.187* -
Thailand [CT] -7.248* 0.979
United Kingdom [C] -3.595** -
United Kingdom [CT] -3.576** 0.509
USA [C] -2.867*** -
USA [CT] -3.446*** 1.803***
Zambia [C] -0.906 -
Zambia [CT] -6.052* -4.594*
Zimbabwe [C] -4.633* -
Zimbabwe [CT] -6.463* -3.821*
Countries  
Belgium [C] -1.007 -
Belgium [CT] -2.523 2.296**
Canada [C] -6.044* -
Canada [CT] -6.162* 1.462
China [C] -5.901* -
China [CT] -6.171* 2.043***
France [C] -3.710* -
France [CT] -4.191* 2.002***
India [C] -6.726* -
India [CT] -6.722* -0.714
Israel [C] -1.736 -
Israel [CT] -3.273*** -2.424**
Japan [C] -3.191** -
Japan [CT] -3.795** -1.966***
Norway [C] -6.556* -
Norway [CT] -6.502* 1.049
South Africa [C] -8.206* -
South Africa [CT] -8.098* -0.633
Switzerland [C] -5.142* -
Switzerland [CT] -5.354* 1.769***
Thailand [C] -7.289* -
Thailand [CT] -7.749* 1.867***
United Kingdom [C] -6.673* -
United Kingdom [CT] -6.583* 0.491
USA [C] -5.611* -
USA [CT] -6.455* 2.979*
Zambia [C] -1.847 -
Zambia [CT] -4.412* -3.535*
Zimbabwe [C] -4.912* -
Zimbabwe [CT] -6.461* -3.821
Notes: *, ** and *** signify rejections at 1%, 5% and10%, respectively.
 and  are the estimated test statistic for unit root and trend respectively
ADF= Augmented Dickey Fuller test, PP= Philip-Perrons test
C = Model with constant, CT= Model with constant and linear trend
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Table 1b Ghana Bilateral Real Exchange Rates
ADF unit Root Test PP unit Root Test
Countries  
Algeria [C] -1.005 -
Algeria [CT] -3.173 3.004*
Canada [C] -0.275 -
Canada [CT] -3.108 3.213*
China [C] -6.362* -
China [CT] 6.724* 1.739***
France [C] 0.643 -
France [CT] -2.962 3.198*
India [C] -1.754 -
India [CT] -3.322*** 3.138*
Japan [C] -0.151 -
Japan [CT] -3.330*** 3.311*
Malaysia [C] -2.912*** -
Malaysia [CT] -4.743* 2.414**
Nigeria [C] -0.712 -
Nigeria [CT] 3.099 2.277**
Norway [C] 0.493 -
Norway [CT] -3.036 3.113*
Singapore [C] -2.253 -
Singapore [CT] -8.294* 5.594*
South Africa [C] -0.384 -
South Africa [CT] -2.842 2.889
Switzerland [C] -0.786 -
Switzerland [CT] -2.786 2.698*
Turkey [C] -2.405 -
Turkey [CT] -2.761 -1.508
UK [C] -0.235 -
UK [CT] -2.993 3.152*
USA [C] 0.063 -
USA [CT] 2.872 3.098*
Countries  
Algeria [C] -0.775 -
Algeria [CT] -3.183 3.004*
Canada [C] 0.432 -
Canada [CT] -2.952 3.211*
China [C] -6.366 -
China [CT] -6.717 1.739***
France [C] 0.572 -
France [CT] -2.727 3.198*
India [C] -0.711 -
India [CT] -3.128 3.138*
Japan [C] 0.412 -
Japan [CT] -2.168 2.904*
Malaysia [C] -4.041* -
Malaysia [CT] -4.811* 2.415**
Nigeria [C] -2.015 -
Nigeria [CT] -2.987 2.277**
Norway [C] -0.037 -
Norway [CT] -3.036 3.113*
Singapore [C] -0.190 -
Singapore [CT] -4.729* 4.765*
South Africa [C] -0.195 -
South Africa [CT] -2.842 2.889*
Switzerland [C] -0.547 -
Switzerland [CT] -2.786 2.698*
Turkey [C] -2.630*** -
Turkey [CT] -3.211*** -2.146**
UK [C] 0.147 -
UK [CT] -2.845 3.152*
USA [C] 0.538 -
USA [CT] -2.743 3.098*
Notes: See Table 1a for the notes.
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Table 1c Kenya Bilateral Real Exchange Rates
ADF Unit Root Tests PP Unit Root Tests 
Countries  
China [C] -4.202* -
China [CT] -5.206* 2.774*
Egypt [C] -4.747* -
Egypt [CT] -4.607* -0.175
France [C] -2.491 -
France [CT] -2.588 0.924
India [C] -4.078* -
India [CT] -4.122* -0.796
Japan [C] -2.647 -
Japan [CT] -3.038 1.096
Malaysia [C] -5.361 -
Malaysia [CT] -7.007* 3.621*
Netherlands [C] -1.931 -
Netherlands [CT] 1.892 0.691
Pakistan [C] -5.253* -
Pakistan [CT] -5.264* -0.667
Saudi Arabia [C] -4.239* -
Saudi Arabia [CT] -4.540* 1.512
Singapore [C] -4.408* -
Singapore [CT] -5.419* 2.719*
South Africa [C] -7.476* -
South Africa [CT] -7.489* -0.805
Spain [C] -1.513 -
Spain [CT] -1.657 0.772
Thailand [C] -5.145* -
Thailand [CT] -5.362* 1.388
UK [C] -4.294* -
UK [CT] -4.199* 0.100
USA [C] -3.092** -
USA [CT] -2.859 0.879
Countries  
China [C] -4.275* -
China [CT] -5.207* 2.774*
Egypt [C] -4.815* -
Egypt [CT] -4.690* -0.175
France [C] -2.491 -
France [CT] -2.483 0.924
India [C] -4.056* -
India [CT] -4.101** -0.795
Japan [C] -2.683 -
Japan [CT] -3.003 -1.317
Malaysia [C] -5.961* -
Malaysia [CT] -6.415* 1.980***
Netherlands [C] -1.886 -
Netherlands [CT] -1.850 0.691
Pakistan [C] -5.152* -
Pakistan [CT] -5.003* 0.375
Saudi Arabia [C] -4.314* -
Saudi Arabia [CT] -4.435* 1.512
Singapore [C] -4.423* -
Singapore [CT] -5.347* 2.611**
South Africa [C] -4.786* -
South Africa [CT] -5.026* -1.807***
Spain [C] -1.374 -
Spain [CT] -1.496 0.772
Thailand [C] -5.470* -
Thailand [CT] -5.195* 0.354
UK [C] -4.294* -
UK [CT] -4.199** 0.100
USA [C] -3.091** -
USA [CT] -2.859 0.879
Notes: See Table 1a for the notes.
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Table 1d Nigeria Bilateral Real Exchange Rates
ADF Unit Root Test PP Unit Root Test
Countries  
Australia [C] -0.575 -
Australia [CT] -1.869 1.839***
Canada [C] -1.609 -
Canada [CT] -3.755** 3.411*
China [C] -0.205 -
China [CT] -3.597** 3.343*
Ivory Coast [C] -1.896 -
Ivory Coast [CT] -3.220*** 3.268*
Ghana [C] -0.712 -
Ghana [CT] -3.224*** -2.574**
India [C] -2.644 -
India [CT] -4.183* 3.555*
Indonesia [C] -2.393 -
Indonesia [CT] -3.577** 2.552**
Japan [C] -2.098 -
Japan [CT] -2.203 2.199**
South Korea [C] -1.243 -
South Korea [CT] -2.685 2.616**
South Africa [C] -2.028 -
South Africa [CT] -5.233* 4.495*
Switzerland [C] -2.104 -
Switzerland [CT] -4.004** 3.275*
Thailand [C] -2.623 -
Thailand [CT] -3.911** 2.743**
Turkey [C] -0.832 -
Turkey [CT] -4.144** -4.115*
UK [C] -1.467 -
UK [CT] -3.621*** 3.420*
USA [C] -0.664 -
USA [CT] -3.550*** 3.754*
Countries  
Australia [C] -1.083 -
Australia [CT] -3.413*** 3.304*
Canada [C] -1.367 -
Canada [CT] -3.673** 3.411*
China [C] -1.175 -
China [CT] -3.027 2.684**
Ivory Coast [C] -1.686 -
Ivory Coast [CT] -3.920** 3.187*
Ghana [C] -1.700 -
Ghana [CT] -3.139 -2.574**
India [C] -2.644 -
India [CT] -4.451* 3.805*
Indonesia [C] -2.186 -
Indonesia [CT] -3.491*** 2.552**
Japan [C] -2.061 -
Japan [CT] -3.028 2.491**
South Korea [C] -0.998 -
South Korea [CT] -2.722 2.662**
South Africa [C] -1.843 -
South Africa [CT] -4.942* 4.238*
Switzerland [C] -2.104 -
Switzerland [CT] -3.977** 3.275*
Thailand [C] -2.623 -
Thailand [CT] -3.911** 2.742*
Turkey [C] -0.446 -
Turkey [CT] -4.135** -4.115*
UK [C] -1.364 -
UK [CT] -3.609** 3.420*
USA [C] -0.261 -
USA [CT] 3.555** 3.754*
Notes: See Table 1a for the notes.
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Table1e South Africa Bilateral Real Exchange Rates
ADF Unit Root Tests ADF Unit Root Tests
Countries  
Botswana [C] -8.206* -
Botswana [CT] -3.422*** -0.955
Canada [C] -3.264*** -
Canada [CT] -3.915** 2.020**
China [C] -5.795* -
China [CT] -5.980* 3.140*
France [C] -1.779 -
France [CT] -2.578 1.938***
India [C] -2.029 -
India [CT] -3.611** 0.389
Japan [C] -3.532** -
Japan [CT] -3.227*** -0.137
Kenya [C] -4.786* -
Kenya [CT] -5.167* 1.807***
Netherlands [C] -0.044 -
Netherlands [CT] -0.511 0.687
Nigeria [C] -2.029 -
Nigeria [CT] -5.234* -4.495*
Switzerland [C] -3.464** -
Switzerland [CT] -4.113** 2.026**
Thailand [C] -5.393* -
Thailand [CT] -5.624* 1.437
Turkey [C] 0.328 -
Turkey [CT] -3.608** -4.003*
UK [C] -2.810*** -
UK [CT] -3.145 1.467
USA [C] -0.929 -
USA [CT] -2.830 2.293**
Zambia [C] -1.352 -
Zambia [CT] -3.745** -3.469*
Countries  
Botswana [C] -8.206* -
Botswana [CT] -8.098* 0.633
Canada [C] -3.263*** -
Canada [CT] -3.831** 2.020**
China [C] -5.785* -
China [CT] -6.600* 2.513**
France [C] -1.467 -
France [CT] -2.382 1.938***
India [C] -3.650* -
India [CT] -3.600** 0.389
Japan [C] -3.561** -
Japan [CT] -3.277*** -0.137
Kenya [C] -4.786* -
Kenya [CT] -5.026* 1.807***
Netherlands [C] 0.037 -
Netherlands [CT] -0.428 0.687
Nigeria [C] -1.843 -
Nigeria [CT] -4.942* -4.238*
Switzerland [C] -3.455** -
Switzerland [CT] -4.078** 2.026**
Thailand [C] -5.026* -
Thailand [CT] -5.226* 1.445
Turkey [C] 0.835 -
Turkey [CT] -3.628** -4.003*
UK [C] -2.745*** -
UK [CT] -3.054 1.467
USA [C] -1.443 -
USA [CT] -2.732 2.293**
Zambia [C] -0.767 -
Zambia [CT] -3.258*** -3.282*
Notes: See Table 1a for the notes.
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Table 1f Tanzania Bilateral Real Exchange Rates
ADF Unit Root Tests PP Unit Root Tests
Countries  
Bahrain [C] -3.370** -
Bahrain [CT] -3.548** 1.182
China [C] -1.184 -
China [CT] -5.001* 4.285*
India [C] -1.260 -
India [CT] -1.116 0.706
Indonesia [C] -2.381 -
Indonesia [CT] -3.419*** 2.542**
Japan [C] -1.008 -
Japan [CT] -2.091 2.203**
Kenya [C] -0.587 -
Kenya [CT] -2.927 3.084*
South Korea [C] -1.169 -
South Korea [CT] -2.146 1.832***
Malaysia [C] -1.406 -
Malaysia [CT] -2.606 2.156**
Saudi Arabia [C] -1.613 -
Saudi Arabia [CT] -2.806 2.275**
Singapore [C] -0.696 -
Singapore [CT] -4.722* 4.002*
South Africa [C] -1.429 -
South Africa [CT] -2.926 2.522**
Switzerland [C] -1.524 -
Switzerland [CT] -3.283*** 2.838*
Turkey [C] -0.470 -
Turkey [CT] -2.729 -2.838*
UK [C] -0.910 -
UK [CT] -2.411 2.034**
USA [C] -0.509 -
USA [CT] -1.968 1.938
Countries  
Bahrain [C] -3.226** -
Bahrain [CT] -3.417*** 1.182
China [C] -1.830 -
China [CT] -5.001* 4.284*
India [C] -0.976 -
India [CT] -4.152** 4.020*
Indonesia [C] -2.476 -
Indonesia [CT] -3.409*** 2.542**
Japan [C] -1.008 -
Japan [CT] -2.095 2.203**
Kenya [C] -0.232 -
Kenya [CT] -2.927 3.084*
South Korea [C] -1.169 -
South Korea [CT] -2.146 1.832***
Malaysia [C] -1.406 -
Malaysia [CT] -2.540 2.156**
Saudi Arabia [C] -1.430 -
Saudi Arabia [CT] -2.808 2.275**
Singapore [C] -1.663 -
Singapore [CT] -4.728* 4.002*
South Africa [C] -1.286 -
South Africa [CT] -2.966 2.522**
Switzerland [C] -1.329 -
Switzerland [CT] -3.270*** 2.838*
Turkey [C] -0.142 -
Turkey [CT] -2.557 -2.838*
UK [C] -0.895 -
UK [CT] -2.247 2.014**
USA [C] -0.501 -
USA [CT] -2.008 1.938**
Notes: See Table 1a for the notes.
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Table 2a: LM Tests
Botswana Bilateral Real Exchange Rates
Countries TB  k  TB1 TB2  k 
Belgium 1996 -5.232* 0 0.40 1972 1998 -7.717* 8 0.2, 0.4
Canada 1990 -4.215*** 5 0.30 1971 1994 -6.877* 0 0.2, 0.4
China 1976 -6.874* 0 0.20 1972 1976 -7.527* 0 0.2, 0.4
France 1996 -7.021* 0 0.40 1976 1999 -12.782* 8 0.2, 0.4
India 1999 -4.722** 0 0.40 1983 1992 -11.230* 8 0.2, 0.4
Israel 1982 -3.822 3 0.30 1973 1985 -8.789* 0 0.2, 0.4
Japan 1982 -7.749* 3 0.30 1972 1983 -126.906* 8 0.2, 0.4
Norway 1994 -5.067* 3 0.40 1982 1995 -9.259* 0 0.2, 0.4
South Africa 1999 -5.694* 0 0.40 1976 1998 -11.696* 8 0.2, 0.4
Switzerland 1999 -7.672* 7 0.40 1976 1999 -13.901* 7 0.2, 0.4
Thailand 1982 -7.660* 0 0.30 1972 2002 -17.212* 8 0.2, 0.6
UK 1995 -8.674* 0 0.40 1980 1999 -10.403* 8 0.2, 0.4
USA 1996 -8.232* 0 0.40 1987 1998 -10.388* 7 0.2, 0.4
Zambia 1989 -180.221* 8 0.30 1989 2004 -10228.77* 8 0.2, 0.6
Zimbabwe 2003 -6.302* 0 0.50 1972 1999 -7.232* 0 0.2, 0.4
Ghana Bilateral Real Exchange Rates
Countries TB  k  TB1 TB2  k 
Algeria 1982 -7.165* 7 0.20 1983 1994 -417.897* 8 0.2, 0.4
Canada 1984 -4.384*** 0 0.20 1982 1992 -5.708** 7 0.2, 0.4
China 1978 -8.833* 1 0.20 1978 1985 -9.088* 1 0.2, 0.4
France 1979 -4.709** 0 0.20 1976 1993 -5.348*** 8 0.2, 0.4
India 1993 -4.229*** 8 0.30 1974 1992 -7.655* 0 0.2, 0.4
Japan 1979 -5.348* 1 0.20 1981 1984 -12.137* 7 0.2, 0.4
Malaysia 1983 -4.722** 5 0.20 1975 1993 -18.889* 5 0.2, 0.4
Nigeria 1993 -4.731** 6 0.30 1982 1997 -6.554* 1 0.2, 0.4
Norway 1983 -5.083* 0 0.20 1979 1984 -6.680* 0 0.2, 0.4
Singapore 1983 -8.720* 0 0.20 1974 1977 -9.229* 0 0.2, 0.4
South Africa 1984 -4.143 0 0.20 1982 1992 -7.603* 5 0.2, 0.4
Switzerland 1984 -3.760 5 0.20 1975 1992 -5.451*** 0 0.2, 0.4
Turkey 1993 -4.390*** 0 0.30 1982 1993 -5.416*** 8 0.2,0.4
UK 1984 -5.280* 0 0.20 1982 1992 -5.660** 5 0.2, 0.4
USA 1983 -4.342*** 6 0.20 1981 1985 -7.303* 8 0.2, 0.4
Notes: *, ** and *** signify rejections at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
 is the estimated test statistics.
TBi are the identied break dates.
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Table 2b LM Tests
Kenya Bilateral Real Exchange Rates
Countries TB  k  TB1 TB2  k 
China 1984 -4.279*** 0 0.20 1978 1994 -5.925** 4 0.2, 0.4
Egypt 1986 -4.062 0 0.30 1971 1988 -5.773** 0 0.2, 0.4
France 1982 -3.812 0 0.20 1979 1994 -5.686** 6 0.2, 0.4
India 1980 -4.451*** 0 0.20 1971 1994 -6.049** 0 0.2, 0.4
Japan 1974 -3.980 1 0.10 1978 1986 -10.427* 8 0.2, 0.4
Malaysia 1994 -9.230* 0 0.30 1990 1994 -10.503* 0 0.2, 0.4
Netherlands 1977 -3.400 0 0.20 1983 2001 -7.142* 8 0.2, 0.6
Pakistan 1974 -6.324* 0 0.10 1992 1994 -6.760* 0 0.2, 0.4
Saudi Arabia 1976 -6.135* 1 0.20 1977 2006 -7.441* 1 0.2, 0.4
Singapore 2002 -6.100* 1 0.50 1983 1995 -8.123* 1 0.2, 0.4
South Africa 2003 -8.075* 0 0.50 1987 2002 -8.525* 0 0.2, 0.6
Spain 1997 -3.435 0 0.40 1973 1997 -7.917* 7 0.2, 0.4
Thailand 1980 -5.638* 0 0.20 1989 1997 -6.438* 3 0.2, 0.4
UK 1974 -5.437* 0 0.10 1977 1994 -6.040** 1 0.2, 0.4
USA 1982 -3.581 0 0.20 1981 1994 -5.839** 8 0.2, 0.4
Nigeria Bilateral Real Exchange Rates
Countries TB  k  TB1 TB2  k 
Australia 1998 -5.291* 1 0.40 1986 1998 -7.354* 1 0.2, 0.4
Canada 1997 -5.114* 2 0.40 1997 2003 -5.702** 2 0.4, 0.6
China 1984 -7.152* 0 0.30 1971 1979 -7.711* 4 0.2, 0.4
Cote DIvoire 1977 -4.776** 7 0.20 1977 1999 -5.524*** 1 0.2, 0.4
Ghana 1978 -5.035** 1 0.20 1979 2006 -11.550* 1 0.2, 0.4
India 1978 -6.857* 1 0.20 1975 1996 -7.386* 1 0.2, 0.4
Indonesia 2000 -3.931 1 0.40 1982 2004 -7.514* 3 0.2, 0.4
Japan 1981 -5.651* 1 0.20 1981 1992 -19.594* 8 0.2, 0.4
South Africa 1977 -6.270* 1 0.20 1977 1996 -6.757* 1 0.2, 0.4
South Korea 1975 -3.904 0 0.20 1982 2004 -7.754* 3 0.2, 0.4
Switzerland 1975 -4.891** 0 0.20 1989 1997 -7.929* 4 0.2, 0.4
Thailand 1977 -4.261*** 1 0.20 1971 1980 -5.775** 1 0.2, 0.4
Turkey 1981 -4.611** 1 0.20 1981 2002 -5.799** 8 0.2, 0.4
United Kingdom 1987 -5.352* 3 0.30 1987 2001 -5.990** 3 0.2, 0.4
USA 1987 -5.197* 3 0.30 1981 1997 -6.660* 7 0.2, 0.4
Notes: See Table 2a for the notes.
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Table 2c LM Tests
South Africa Bilateral Real Exchange Rates
Countries TB  k  TB1 TB2  k 
Botswana 1999 -5.694* 0 0.40 1976 1998 -11.696* 8 0.2, 0.4
Canada 1983 -4.750** 0 0.30 1992 2004 -6.912* 2 0.4, 0.6
China 1984 -6.636* 1 0.30 1971 1981 -7.918* 6 0.2, 0.4
France 1997 -6.745* 8 0.40 1984 1997 -7.974* 8 0.2, 0.4
India 1987 -6.102* 7 0.30 1994 2003 -7.665* 7 0.4, 0.6
Japan 1984 -5.765* 1 0.30 1976 1988 -6.536* 0 0.2, 0.4
Kenya 2004 -5.814* 0 0.50 1988 2002 -6.424* 0 0.2, 0.6
Netherlands 1988 -2.845 0 0.30 1984 2000 -4.303 0 0.2, 0.6
Nigeria 1977 -5.998* 1 0.20 1978 1997 -6.876* 1 0.2, 0.4
Switzerland 1978 -4.827** 0 0.20 1986 1997 -7.919* 8 0.2, 0.4
Thailand 1988 -4.790** 4 0.30 1973 1998 -6.634* 0 0.2, 0.4
Turkey 1977 -4.417*** 0 0.20 1981 1999 -5.921** 0 0.2, 0.4
UK 1985 -5.614* 3 0.30 1980 1999 -6.648* 4 0.2, 0.4
USA 1985 -5.121** 1 0.30 1982 1997 -5.879** 1 0.2, 0.4
Zambia 1993 -6.509* 0 0.30 1989 1995 -7.754* 0 0.2, 0.4
Tanzania Bilateral Real Exchange Rates
Countries TB  k  TB1 TB2  k 
Bahrain 1996 -6.122* 7 0.30 1981 1996 -6.569* 7 0.20, 0.40
China 1979 -4.871** 0 0.10 1978 1991 -5.345*** 8 0.20, 0.40
India 1980 -5.390* 4 0.20 1980 1988 -7.961* 4 0.20, 0.40
Indonesia 1984 -2.420 3 0.20 1982 1998 -6.200* 0 0.20, 0.40
Japan 1976 -4.310*** 0 0.10 1971 1982 -7.417* 8 0.20, 0.40
Kenya 1980 -3.397 7 0.20 1985 1990 -5.100 7 0.20, 0.40
South Korea 1981 -3.544 2 0.20 1979 1992 -6.702* 7 0.20, 0.40
Malaysia 1982 -3.728 0 0.20 1978 1990 -5.858** 8 0.20, 0.40
Saudi Arabia 1989 -4.408*** 5 0.20 1978 1994 -6.535* 7 0.20, 0.40
Singapore 1975 -4.311*** 7 0.10 1979 1991 -6.720* 7 0.20, 0.40
South Africa 1980 -3.781 0 0.20 1979 1988 -5.889** 3 0.20, 0.40
Switzerland 1982 -4.449*** 0 0.20 1981 1992 -9.279* 6 0.20, 0.40
Turkey 1982 -3.638 7 0.20 1976 1985 -7.567* 2 0.20, 0.40
UK 1980 -4.372**** 2 0.20 1973 1989 -5.356*** 6 0.20, 0.40
USA 1979 -3.499 0 0.10 1975 1992 -4.901 8 0.20, 0.40
Notes: See Table 2a for the notes.
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Table 3a: Tests for Symmetric Cointegration
Botswana
Country 0 1 2 ADF  k AIC
Belgium 8.029 -5.108 3.723 -2.366 -0.246 2 128.49
Canada 1.644 -1.054 1.049 -3.719 -0.468 2 -64.65
China -0.130 -0.436 0.399 -1.575 -0.123 1 -28.55
France 2.726 -2.524 2.339 -2.487 -0.304 2 60.86
India -0.985 -1.139 0.927 -2.931 -0.224 1 -56.51
Israel 0.497 -0.977 0.959 -2.584 -0.270 2 -44.68
Japan 7.226 -0.647 0.468 -3.281 -0.410 2 -4.33
Norway -1.506 -0.617 0.931 -3.776 -0.669 2 -87.51
South Africa 0.135 -0.530 0.464 -3.254 -0.333 2 -128.74
Switzerland -1.917 -0.207 0.981 -4.457 -0.577 1 -60.31
Thailand -2.427 -0.623 0.767 -3.813 -0.386 1 -67.60
United Kingdom -0.027 -0.005 0.468 -1.697 -0.073 1 -52.96
USA 1.481 -0.971 1.050 -2.939 -0.318 2 -52.53
Zambia -3.648 -0.978 0.812 -1.448 -0.145 2 4.63
Zimbabwe 2.460 1.882 -2.027 -1.353 -0.047 1 132.98
Ghana
Country 0 1 2 ADF  k AIC
Algeria -5.995 -0.478 0.832 -2.602 -0.030 2 44.04
Canada 12.309 -4.363 1.638 -2.827 -0.190 1 57.18
China -11.927 1.472 0.581 -2.683 -0.265 2 41.12
France 16.656 -5.740 2.102 -3.420 -0.359 2 93.42
India -9.877 0.684 0.556 -2.860 -0.166 1 44.77
Japan 0.391 -2.408 1.317 -3.198 -0.199 1 53.31
Malaysia 15.104 -5.149 1.566 -2.667 -0.226 2 63.77
Nigeria -5.915 -0.469 0.712 -4.166 -0.507 1 69.82
Norway 3.317 -2.567 1.414 -2.624 -0.184 3 50.34
South Africa -13.987 2.801 -0.280 -2.081 -0.212 2 55.05
Singapore 14.049 -4.586 1.452 -2.708 -0.231 2 61.93
Switzerland 4.196 -2.279 1.281 -2.421 -0.160 2 57.20
Turkey 0.023 -0.493 0.419 -2.526 -0.218 2 52.95
United Kingdom -4.230 0.042 0.886 -2.133 -0.094 1 50.34
USA 16.771 -5.471 1.819 -2.881 -0.248 2 64.50
Notes: *, ** and *** signify rejections at 1%, 5% and 10%. Notes: These results are based on
the OLS estimation of Eq. (1), followed by ADF unit root tests dened in Eq. (2) where
 is the autoregressive coe¢ cient.
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Table 3b: Tests for Symmetric Cointegration
Kenya
Country 0 1 2 ADF  k AIC
China 2.432 -0.461 0.431 -2.735 -0.489 2 -30.39
Egypt 2.825 0.122 -0.148 -3.585 -0.435 2 4.14
France 4.255 -1.732 1.691 -2.705 -0.335 2 70.90
India 1.326 -0.825 0.652 -3.265 -0.362 1 -65.67
Japan -3.823 -0.149 0.192 -2.046 -0.157 1 -14.19
Malaysia 1.039 -0.126 0.577 -2.220 -0.182 1 -39.00
Netherlands 2.445 -0.710 1.112 -2.421 -0.314 2 5.24
Pakistan 1.901 -1.283 0.933 -3.239 -0.376 1 -23.49
South Africa 2.461 -0.271 0.257 -3.014 -0.351 2 -22.92
Saudi Arabia 0.875 -0.179 0.612 -2.844 -0.138 2 -48.11
Singapore 1.982 -0.421 0.840 -1.728 -0.113 1 -54.83
Spain 0.691 -2.725 3.282 -2.665 -0.281 2 167.14
Thailand -0.059 -0.494 0.674 -2.034 -0.172 1 -39.54
United Kingdom 2.383 0.074 0.427 -1.746 -0.074 1 -54.46
USA 3.232 -0.577 0.811 -1.446 -0.102 1 -50.42
Nigeria
Country 0 1 2 ADF  k AIC
Australia 5.365 -1.392 1.201 -3.080 -0.321 2 69.56
Canada 6.486 -1.628 1.213 -3.165 -0.291 2 1.46
China -2.943 -1.418 1.426 -3.199 -0.368 2 61.34
Cote DIvoire -0.598 -1.407 1.218 -3.285 -0.341 2 75.52
Ghana 5.915 -0.711 0.469 -4.166 -0.507 1 69.82
India 2.998 -1.663 1.224 -3.262 -0.290 1 69.65
Indonesia 8.753 -0.843 1.180 -0.227 -0.004 2 79.90
Japan -0.379 -1.063 1.197 -3.561 -0.313 1 74.34
South Africa 2.641 -0.949 0.979 -2.655 -0.269 2 74.94
South Korea -0.825 -1.576 1.546 -0.906 -0.054 3 79.07
Switzerland 4.754 -1.228 1.199 -3.093 -0.325 2 70.62
Thailand 3.796 -1.803 1.253 -3.477 -0.350 1 69.15
Turkey 7.453 -0.316 -0.348 -2.330 -0.224 2 70.74
United Kingdom 1.169 0.129 0.695 -2.107 -0.125 1 73.71
USA 7.265 -1.810 1.280 -3.302 -0.318 2 65.09
Notes: See Table 3a for the notes.
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Table 3c: Tests for Symmetric Cointegration
South Africa
Country 0 1 2 ADF  k AIC
Botswana -0.135 -0.464 0.530 -3.254 -0.333 2 -128.74
Canada 1.911 -1.245 1.195 -3.107 -0.400 2 -45.08
China -0.606 -0.300 0.402 -1.756 -0.174 2 -16.10
France 2.695 -2.657 2.425 -2.188 -0.194 2 69.96
India -1.563 -0.742 0.669 -2.583 -0.228 2 -40.40
Japan -5.663 -0.529 1.171 -3.869 -0.477 2 -33.86
Kenya -2.461 -0.257 0.271 -3.014 -0.351 2 -22.92
Netherlands 0.083 -0.997 1.373 -1.964 -0.154 2 7.53
Nigeria -2.641 -0.979 0.949 -2.655 -0.269 2 74.94
Switzerland -1.677 -0.344 1.078 -3.790 -0.568 2 -41.30
Thailand -2.097 -0.853 0.949 -4.938 -0.864 2 -58.79
Turkey 3.526 -0.818 0.394 -2.944 -0.377 2 -9.22
United Kingdom -0.180 0.039 0.491 -1.742 -0.089 2 -32.42
USA 2.037 -1.280 1.250 -2.825 -0.348 2 -34.83
Zambia -3.381 -0.915 0.687 -1.547 -0.156 2 8.20
Tanzania
Country 0 1 2 ADF  k AIC
Bahrain 7.462 -0.977 1.098 -3.198 -0.282 2 -30.76
China -1.493 0.952 0.408 -2.968 -0.311 2 -12.03
India 4.389 -1.463 1.182 -2.097 -0.157 2 -11.86
Indonesia -2.831 -0.541 0.822 -0.871 -0.034 2 36.62
Japan 2.500 -1.295 1.275 -3.093 -0.250 2 0.96
Kenya 1.001 -0.392 0.737 -2.969 -0.196 2 -9.20
Malaysia 11.817 -2.689 1.367 -3.243 -0.341 2 -13.28
South Africa 6.987 -2.095 1.667 -2.812 -0.257 2 16.20
Saudi Arabia 5.267 -0.942 1.041 -3.597 -0.271 2 -33.94
Singapore 11.238 -2.332 1.329 -3.200 -0.277 2 -16.39
South Korea 1.002 -1.585 1.364 -3.626 -0.392 3 -2.61
Switzerland 9.125 -1.846 1.337 -3.152 -0.263 2 1.565
Turkey 7.367 -0.767 0.605 -3.084 -0.204 2 11.24
United Kingdom 2.629 0.368 0.646 -2.501 -0.176 2 30.45
USA 11.599 -2.511 1.503 -3.988 -0.395 3 -37.07
Notes: See Table 3a for the notes.
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Table 4a: Tests for Asymmetric Cointegration
Botswana
Country Model  1 2 u F1=2 AIC LB-Q
Belgium MTAR -0.15 -0.02 -0.60 8.65 10.55 117.73 4.08[0.39]
Canada MTAR 0.02 -0.79 -0.28 11.23 6.87 -68.20 0.59[0.96]
China MTAR 0.10 0.30 -0.22 5.66 8.44 -34.04 7.48[0.11]
France MTAR -0.10 -0.48 0.05 6.64 6.38 55.27 1.31[0.85]
India MTAR 0.05 -0.41 -0.14 6.11 3.24 -56.66 2.76[0.59]
Israel TAR -0.17 -0.32 -0.18 3.60 0.59 -42.30 3.36[0.49]
Japan TAR 0.18 -0.62 -0.20 7.87 4.22 -6.53 0.98[0.91]
Norway MTAR 0.08 -0.84 -0.64 7.30 0.49 -84.18 1.20[0.88]
South Africa MTAR 0.05 -0.60 -0.20 7.52 3.81 -128.03 1.20[0.88]
Switzerland MTAR -0.06 -0.48 -1.10 12.91 4.50 -61.63 0.86[0.92]
Thailand MTAR 0.08 -0.29 0.38 9.55 3.73 -68.02 5.11[0.28]
United Kingdom MTAR -0.01 0.02 -0.17 4.39 5.63 -55.51 1.76[0.78]
USA MTAR 0.07 -0.60 -0.16 7.74 5.91 -55.41 0.78[0.94]
Zambia MTAR 0.06 -0.34 -0.04 2.57 2.96 3.54 0.40[0.98]
Zimbabwe MTAR 0.05 0.01 -0.15 3.64 5.29 127.12 2.47[0.65]
Ghana
Country Model  1 2 u F1=2 AIC LB-Q
Algeria MTAR -0.20 -0.31 0.03 5.15 3.14b 41.77 2.14[0.71]
Canada MTAR 0.10 -0.37 -0.11 6.08 3.71b 54.24 5.48[0.24]
China MTAR 0.21 -0.82 -0.21 7.07 6.06 36.15 2.97[0.56]
France MTAR -0.14 -0.60 0.42 10.22 7.05 86.37 0.64[0.96]
India MTAR -0.25 -0.27 0.09 9.73 9.66 36.58 1.93[0.75]
Japan MTAR 0.20 -0.37 -0.09 8.32 5.39 49.80 4.21[0.38]
Malaysia MTAR 0.05 -0.34 -0.13 4.51 1.77 62.62 4.73[0.32]
Nigeria TAR -0.33 -0.39 -0.68 9.65 1.68 68.66 1.44[0.84]
Norway MTAR 0.06 -0.43 -0.06 8.05 8.00 43.19 8.98[0.06]
South Africa MTAR -0.30 -0.11 -0.45 3.93 3.31 52.48 4.87[0.30]
Singapore TAR -0.45 -0.32 -0.16 4.29 1.23 61.40 4.56[0.33]
Switzerland MTAR 0.17 -0.35 -0.03 5.98 5.48 52.43 9.68[0.04]
Turkey MTAR 0.29 -0.45 -0.17 4.19 1.87 51.92 0.76[0.94]
United Kingdom MTAR 0.18 -0.31 0.01 8.43 11.27 40.65 17.71[0.00]
USA MTAR -0.10 -0.06 -0.55 10.76 11.22 54.34 5.20[0.27]
Notes: These estimates are based on the estimation of Eq. (7 & 8). This test follows a non-standard
distribution so the test statistics are compared with critical values reported in Enders and Dibooglu (2001).
*, ** and *** signify rejections at 1%, 5% and 10%
u entries are the non-standard F-stat distribution for the null hypothesis of no cointegration
(1 = 2 = 0) for both TAR and MTAR.
F1=2 these are conventional F-statistics whereas  t-statistic for test of symmetry
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Table 4b: Tests for Asymmetric Cointegration
Kenya
Country Model  1 2 u F1=2 AIC LB-Q
China MTAR 0.05 -1.19 -0.14 14.60 18.81 -44.77 3.03[0.55]
Egypt MTAR -0.05 -0.28 -0.78 10.52 6.61 -0.54 2.41[0.66]
France MTAR -0.06 -0.05 -0.64 8.10 7.81 63.76 4.19[0.38]
India MTAR 0.03 -0.79 -0.12 12.90 12.58 -74.16 4.01[0.40]
Japan MTAR -0.13 -0.19 0.03 2.99 2.24 -15.79 0.52[0.97]
Malaysia TAR -0.09 -0.24 -0.08 2.98 1.04 -37.26 1.71[0.79]
Netherlands TAR -0.19 -0.11 -0.68 6.99 7.31 -0.12 3.04[0.55]
Pakistan MTAR 0.02 -0.63 0.02 11.82 10.97 -31.44 0.91[0.92]
South Africa MTAR 0.12 -0.60 -0.26 5.87 2.37 -22.86 1.46[0.83]
Saudi Arabia TAR 0.14 -0.11 -0.33 4.45 2.34 -45.94 1.65[0.80]
Singapore TAR 0.10 -0.16 -0.06 1.77 0.57 -52.30 2.79[0.59]
Spain MTAR -0.28 -0.43 0.10 7.69 7.32 158.53 6.69[0.15]
Thailand MTAR 0.03 -0.44 -0.01 5.79 6.93 -43.57 5.26[0.26]
United Kingdom TAR 0.22 -0.16 -0.03 2.63 2.14 -53.54 3.24[0.52]
USA MTAR 0.05 -0.45 -0.01 5.00 7.62 -54.86 1.88[0.76]
Nigeria
Country Model  1 2 u F1=2 AIC LB-Q
Australia MTAR -0.19 -0.17 -0.83 11.90 12.02 58.69 2.86[0.58]
Canada MTAR -0.12 -0.18 -0.62 8.98 6.71 61.21 2.23[0.69]
China TAR -0.45 -0.23 -0.62 7.34 3.82 58.25 2.28[0.68]
Cote DIvoire MTAR -0.06 -0.57 -0.05 11.57 10.19 66.12 0.76[0.94]
Ghana TAR 0.38 -0.68 -0.39 9.64 1.68 68.66 1.43[0.84]
India MTAR 0.07 -0.76 -0.19 10.19 8.15 62.37 1.28[0.87]
Indonesia MTAR 0.11 -0.82 -0.14 24.90 31.56 37.46 1.15[0.89]
Japan MTAR -0.18 -0.21 -0.73 10.32 6.51 68.48 1.91[0.75]
South Africa MTAR -0.11 -0.09 -0.52 6.98 6.14 69.30 1.43[0.84]
South Korea MTAR -0.25 -0.21 -1.02 17.08 18.88 47.23 3.66[0.45]
Switzerland MTAR -0.15 -0.51 -0.04 9.26 7.58 63.69 1.14[0.89]
Thailand MTAR -0.22 -0.17 -0.76 11.49 8.91 61.19 0.98[0.91]
Turkey MTAR -0.25 -0.17 -0.60 4.45 3.22 68.06 4.39[0.35]
United Kingdom MTAR 0.04 -0.44 -0.04 7.57 9.88 64.80 0.83[0.93]
USA MTAR -0.08 -0.21 -0.53 7.51 3.52 62.22 0.89[0.93]
Notes: See Table 4a for the notes.
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Table 4c: Tests for Asymmetric Cointegration
South Africa
Country Model  1 2 u F1=2 AIC LB-Q
Botswana MTAR -0.05 -0.20 -0.60 7.52 3.81 -128.03 1.20[0.88]
Canada TAR 0.15 -0.78 -0.21 9.59 8.04 -50.12 0.76[0.94]
China MTAR 0.10 -0.35 -0.11 2.35 1.57 -15.34 1.74[0.78]
France MTAR 0.03 -0.55 0.01 10.07 14.00 57.40 8.41[0.07]
India TAR 0.21 -0.61 -0.08 9.99 11.75 -48.84 1.97[0.74]
Japan MTAR 0.06 -0.70 -0.31 10.11 4.20 -35.43 1.59[0.81]
Kenya TAR 0.16 -0.52 -0.29 5.19 1.25 -21.69 0.74[0.95]
Netherlands MTAR 0.09 -0.61 -0.03 9.37 13.81 -3.61 7.00[0.13]
Nigeria MTAR 0.13 -0.52 -0.10 6.98 6.14 69.29 1.43[0.84]
Switzerland TAR 0.11 -0.69 -0.46 7.72 1.06 -39.50 2.06[0.72]
Thailand MTAR 0.09 -1.08 -0.64 14.58 3.48 -59.14 3.63[0.46]
Turkey TAR -0.15 -0.28 -0.57 5.14 1.51 -8.53 4.05[0.40]
United Kingdom MTAR 0.07 -0.31 -0.03 4.60 5.84 -35.63 2.12[0.71]
USA MTAR 0.11 -0.43 -0.26 4.32 0.71 -32.78 1.23[0.87]
Zambia MTAR 0.01 -0.43 0.03 5.46 8.16 1.99 0.42[0.98]
Tanzania
Country Model  1 2 u F1=2 AIC LB-Q
Bahrain MTAR -0.02 -0.14 -0.41 7.09 3.35 -31.48 2.64[0.62]
China TAR -0.25 -0.27 -0.36 4.45 0.26 -9.91 2.43[0.66]
India MTAR -0.16 -0.05 -0.46 5.99 6.95 -16.51 2.02[0.73]
Indonesia MTAR -0.14 -0.03 0.44 4.22 5.25 30.31 2.06[0.73]
Japan MTAR -0.10 -0.05 -0.62 17.61 20.99 -15.48 2.91[0.57]
Kenya MTAR 0.10 -0.60 -0.15 7.71 5.60 -12.62 1.15[0.89]
Malaysia TAR -0.27 -0.21 -0.56 7.47 3.72 -14.76 3.81[0.43]
South Africa TAR -0.39 -0.07 -0.41 6.60 4.59 13.18 5.62[0.22]
Saudi Arabia MTAR -0.12 -0.19 -0.47 8.76 3.71 34.96 9.83[0.04]
Singapore MTAR 0.03 -0.47 -0.18 7.30 3.69 -17.78 2.63[0.62]
South Korea TAR -0.60 -0.04 -0.34 4.95 5.07 4.74 1.99[0.74]
Switzerland MTAR -0.15 -0.12 -0.73 16.34 18.53 -13.09 7.40[0.12]
Turkey MTAR -0.01 -0.41 -0.11 7.89 5.28 7.65 5.56[0.23]
United Kingdom MTAR 0.13 -0.75 -0.14 6.23 5.52 26.21 4.41[0.35]
USA TAR 0.23 -0.27 -0.49 9.40 2.35 -36.63 5.11[0.28]
Notes: See Table 4a for the notes.
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